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3ABSTRACT
Globally, African countries are the most centralised in terms of formal governance
structures. Approaching decentralisation as a complex, relative, instrumental and multidi-
mensional process, this paper highlights the motivations and dilemmas of recent decen-
tralisation policies and programmes in Africa. It discusses the main features of African de-
centralisation policies and practices in colonial and post-colonial times with special focus
on the 1980s and beyond. This period is associated with structural adjustment and democ-
ratisation. A framework for analysing decentralisation policies and programmes is pro-
posed. This is the basis for suggested improvements in the design and implementation of
decentralisation policies in African and possibly, other developing states.

11. INTRODUCTION
Historical, political, economic factors explain the poorer development of local gov-
ernment institutions in developing countries compared to industrialised countries. In the
1990s, however, Africa's national governments (as other less developed (LDCs) and tran-
sitional countries) and international development agencies renewed their interest in local
self-government institutions as distinct from deconcentrated structures which have always
been favoured. These factors include: globalisation, economic crisis and the response of
structural adjustment, democratisation and local, domestic forces such as rapid urbanisa-
tion, stronger ethnic identities etc. (See Wunsch & Olowu 1990, McCarney 1996).
The decision to focus on African countries is both pragmatic and deliberate. It is
pragmatic in that LDCs constitute a wide diversity of countries; hence a focus on Africa
makes the discussion more manageable especially on the subject of decentralisation. It is
also deliberate in view of the fact that the relationship between adjustment/democratisation
and the institutionalisation of local government in Latin America, the former Eastern
European countries and Asia has been the subject of much more systematic research and
analysis (Regulska 1993, Campbell 1997, Fukasaku & Hausmann 1998, Rood 2000).
Compared to these other developing countries, decentralisation policies have remained
poorly analysed and developed in African countries and local governments are least devel-
oped there than other regions of the world (UNDP 1993).
Africa, for instance, has the highest proportion of World Bank (WB) decentralisa-
tion projects among LDCs, it has the least formal analytical work on decentralisation or
intergovernmental relations (Litvack et. al 1997: 35). Decentralisation policies and pro-
grammes in Africa are designed more often on the basis of ideological arguments (which
exult the supremacy of party, state or market) rather than an analysis of the empirical real-
ity of what exists on the ground. This is further aggravated by the paucity of information
on local political economy issues. This may in part, explain why African decentralisation
evaluations have with but a few, very limited exceptions, been negative (Compare:
Rondinelli 1981, Mawhood 1983, Olowu 1988, Crook & Manor 1998; with Olowu 1989,
Olowu & Smoke 1992).
22. DECENTRALISATION CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS AND 
CLASSIFICATION
Decentralisation the deliberate and planned transfer of authority and resources
away from the central state institutions to peripheral institutions has acquired considerable
popularity especially in developing countries. But this popularity in the scholarly and pol-
icy circles has not always been for the best: it has made the term to become slippery (Bird
1995), one that means different things to different people (Conyers 1985).
Decentralisation takes many forms e.g. the delegation of responsibility and author-
ity to field units of the same department or level of government referred to as deconcen-
tration or the devolution of authority to locally constituted units of government or special
purpose authorities. Other forms include privatisation, deregulation (Rondinelli 1981)
but there are also references to territorial and functional decentralisation (United Nations
1965, Rondinelli 1981, Smith 1985). Variants in the decentralisation family have also been
suggested: hybrid or partial decentralisation whereby responsibilities and personnel are
decentralised but not financing (as in the Decentralisation Act of 1982 in Nepal) (Silver-
man 1992: 15). Another is market decentralisation referring to the decentralisation from
governments to market, quasi-market and non-governmental organisations, as distinct from
most of the forms mentioned earlier which are referred to as intergovernmental decen-
tralisation (Bennett 1994: 11). Market decentralisation incorporating not only privatisa-
tion, but contracting, fiscal decentralisation, public private partnerships has recently ac-
quired new prominence as it has become a part of the new public sector management re-
forms which are driven by international finance institutions (IFIs). These are also referred
to as forms of economic decentralisation (Mackintosh & Roy 1999).
Decentralisation is a relative, complex, instrumental and multidimensional process.
It is relative in that it describes the distribution of state resources (responsibility, finance,
personnel or discretionary authority) between various institutional actors within the state
and/or society against some normative mode in space or time. It is complex in that it incor-
porates and is impacted upon by political, economic, institutional and cultural factors.
Moreover, programmes of decentralisation are a mixture of centralisation, privatisation,
deconcentration and in some cases devolution. These facts make decentralisation an in-
strumental concept in that it is a means to specific ends (improved service delivery,
3empowerment, poverty alleviation etc not an end in itself. Finally, decentralisation is a
multidimensional process which defines the distribution of power and resources between
state and society, the executive and other branches of the government, at micro level be-
tween central and local governments, central government and their field administrations,
between central/local governments and non-governmental entities as well as at higher lev-
els between governmental units within a federal or international system.
Three aspects of decentralisation are focussed in this paper devolution, deconcen-
tration and federations for two reasons. First, they are closely related to one another con-
ceptually: they belong to the generic form of decentralisation that can be referred to as in-
ter-governmental or intra-governmental decentralisation. While market decentralisation or
privatisation may be related in some sense to efforts to decentralise, the latter concepts
raise several other issues relating to the management of national economies, which are be-
yond the scope of this discussion. Secondly, and, more importantly, these three concepts
have constituted the focus of government policy pronouncements on decentralisation in
LDCs and especially in African countries, although different forms of market decentralisa-
tion are taking the centre stage in many African public services as well.
Through devolution, the central government confers or recognises self-governing
capacities on local communities. Critical attributes of local self-government include local-
ity, representativeness, governmental character or responsibilities and institutional auton-
omy. (See Mawhood 1983, Olowu 1988, Anderson 1995). Any programme of devolution-
ary decentralisation or DD will thus involve the transfer of legislative, political, adminis-
trative and financial authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions and
services from the central government to local authorities. It is also possible to include un-
der this rubric, the growing involvement of non-governmental (NGOs) and community
based organisations (CBOs) in the management of local services in the 1990s. Local gov-
ernments are likely to be effective when they integrate formal and informal structures of
local governance (Putnam 1993, Dia 1996).
Deconcentration or field administration is just as important as devolution. There
are, however, three fundamental differences between the two forms of decentralisation.
First, one involves the intra-organisational transfer of responsibilities (deconcentration)
whereas the other is inter-organisational delegation of responsibilities and discretionary
4authority. Secondly, the primary objective of deconcentration is efficiency and effective-
ness of the central administrative system whereas the primary consideration of devolution
is political popular participation and empowerment. Field administrations could be organ-
ised along functional or prefectorial lines (fully or partially integrated) (Smith 1985, Ada-
molekun 1999)
Federations are different from the first two concepts of decentralisation in two im-
portant respects. First, a federation relates to the delimitation of responsibilities between
two separate political entities, one of which operates at the national level while the other
operates at the meso or regional level. On the other hand, local governments and field ad-
ministrations are based primarily at the micro or community level. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, federation utilises the principle of constitutional non-centralisation rather than
decentralisation. The idea is to create a system of governance, which at the same time pro-
vides opportunities for collaboration over a number of strategic areas while the federating
units keep their relative independence in respect of other domestic matters. The federal
principle is at present being utilised also at the supranational (e.g. the European Union, the
East African federation and Southern African Development Community) and metropolitan
(e.g. Abidjan municipality comprising ten city districts) levels (Elazar 1987).
Up until the 1980s, African decentralisation policies were either explicitly or im-
plicitly confined to deconcentration even though the language of devolution was used.
Even federal systems in the few countries which utilised them in the continent (Nigeria and
Tanzania) were operated as unitary systems (Wunsch & Olowu 1995). By the end of the
1990s, however, structural adjustment and political liberalisation policies had compelled
many states in the region to adopt devolutionary decentralisation and, in a few but growing
numbers of cases, even federalism. It is thus possible at the present time to classify African
countries in terms of those with progressive policies on decentralisation and those that
have stuck with the old forms of deconcentration. Still in a third category are those that
have gone further to experiment with federal arrangements. A sample of countries in the
different groups is provided below:
• Deconcentration with nominal devolution: Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Zam-
bia etc.
5• Devolution: Mauritius, Senegal, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria,
Tanzania etc.
• Partial Devolution (Urban Areas Only): Namibia, Mozambique, Botswana etc.
• Federations: Republic of South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania.
The conscious articulation of decentralisation as a policy choice is in reality only
one type of response to the factors pushing in the direction of DD. Another type of re-
sponse, not analysed here but well documented also in the literature, is what is best re-
ferred to as decentralisation by default: one in which people and communities fill up the
void left by the state (see McGaffey 1992 with respect to Zaire). In the next section, we
provide a brief overview of decentralisation policies and practices since the end of World
War II when many of these mostly poor countries started to become self-governing1. This
will provide the background to an analysis of decentralisation programmes and policies of
the 1980s and 1990s.
3. FOUR PHASES OF DECENTRALISATION IN AFRICA.
Like other LDCs, African states can be described as both highly centralised and de-
centralised. In terms of broad state-society relations, African countries are decentralised.
Most economic activities remain uncaptured by the state, a fact which is regarded as an
illustration of state weakness (Hyden 1983, Migdal 1988). On the other hand, they are also
highly centralized, having been forged out of colonial conquest. Colonised peoples were
regarded as neither possessing the intellectual nor cultural capacities for local self-
governance. Beginning from India and spreading later to Africa, the predominant form of
government was 'indirect rule'. This meant rule by a few colonial officials with the aid of
the most compliant traditional rulers. Where no such rulers existed, they were created as in
eastern Nigeria and parts of eastern and southern Africa. The objective was to provide the
minimal conditions for law and order, taxation and justice for the colonial order. Local
administration comprised a native court system, a local tax and a treasury.
While this system succeeded in guaranteeing the conquered territories for its new
masters, it could not serve as the vehicle for economic and social development of the colo-
nies. Most importantly, it failed to provide avenues for political participation and
empowerment for the growing number of educated elites which the colonial system itself
6produced. Opposition to rule by traditional rulers also grew as many of them remained il-
literate, extremely conservative and corrupt. Countries such as Tanzania abolished the in-
stitution altogether (Mandami 1996).
3.1 Phase One (1945 Early 1960s):
After the Second World War, decolonization came to top the agenda in interna-
tional relations for a variety of reasons: reward for the colonised peoples' participation in
the war, agitation by the growing number of educated elites from the colonies, and the as-
cendancy of social liberal parties in the colonising countries Britain and France. One evi-
dence of this is the colonial despatch of the British Secretary of State for the Colonies in
1947. He argued in the despatch that the 'development of an efficient and democratic sys-
tem of local government' was a key to success in African administration (cited in Hicks
1961:4).
Largely as a result of this policy shift, important changes were made in local gov-
ernment throughout British and later Francophone Africa. During the late colonial period,
the outlines of the system of local government were thus already fully established in Brit-
ish Africa and to some extent in the French municipalities. It had the following key attrib-
utes:
• A tradition of elected councils;
• A well defined local tax system (ranging from per capita flat rates in most places to
graduated personal rates in Eastern Africa. and the beginning of a property/land tax in
the major urban centres);
• Involvement of local governments in a range of minimal infrastructure services: espe-
cially in education, health and sanitation, rural roads and water supply agricultural ex-
tension services and natural resource management all of these with carefully articulated
grant systems from the central government.
• Involvement of local governments in cities in major capital investment activities and
the rural ones in co-operatives and community development activities (Davey 1980,
Stren 1989).
This period has been described as the golden age of local government in Africa and
the experience was not peculiar to Africa (Hicks 1961, Olowu 1989). Reform efforts since
7that time have tried to place local government on the same pedestal they were during this
time.
3.2 Phase Two (Early 1960s to Late 1970s):
Instead of building on the gains of this period, Africa's post-independence leaders
sought to dismantle this legacy. There were two major rationales for this development. On
the economic front, Africa's new crop of indigenous political leadership believed that the
only way to demonstrate the worth of the new leadership was in rapid development
achievements. They subscribed to a programme of central planning and in most places to a
socialist ideology to promote development. Ghana's Nkrumah had argued that political in-
dependence was the springboard for economic and social development. They now had to
deliver and they saw democratic local governments as irritants at best if not obstacles to
their ambition to build powerful economic states.
Secondly, the consolidation of the nation-state via a single party mechanism was
also high on the agenda. A new wave of decentralisation reforms ensued which tried to
forge local administrations that were essentially instruments of control within the frame-
work of the one-party or military state. Local governments read local administration were
designed primarily for the maintenance of law and order and only secondarily for the im-
plementation of centrally determined development plans. They also had political objectives
such as participation but these were to be carried out mainly through consultative assem-
blies, which had no real powers over the government officials in charge of the local gov-
ernments.
Philip Mawhood (1983: 8) best captured the state of affairs:
In the 1960s, (there followed) for most countries a swing away from local auton-
omy in favour of central planning and greater control over public resources. A de-
concentrated administration was left in charge of the locality, similar to but
weaker than the colonial one. It was aided by committees that hardly had a role
beyond discussing development plans and giving help in their implementation'
Other reviews confirmed that most of these decentralisation policies. They were de-
scribed as 'the rhetoric of decentralisation and the reality of centralization' in most devel-
oping countries (Subramaniam 1980) and in Africa as 'attempts at window dressing in-
creasing centralisation' (Olowu 1988: 40). Indeed, some of the main actors in the process
8lamented afterwards. For instance, late President Nyerere of Tanzania (1984: 828) re-
canted:
There are certain things I would not do if I were to start again. One of them is the
abolition of local governments and the other was the disbanding of co-operatives.
We were impatient and ignorant.. We had these two useful instruments of partici-
pation and we got rid of them. It is true that local governments were afraid of
taking decisions but instead of helping them we abolished them. Those were two
major mistakes..
3.3 Phase Three (Late 1970s to End of 1980s):
When the economic crisis of the 1970s emerged, most of them responded, usually
at the prompting of international finance institutions, by adopting structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs), which approached decentralisation to local governments as a possible
mechanism for cutting back central government expenditures. How did the SAPs impact
on decentralisation?
Even before SAP, many governments in Africa had sought to hive off their respon-
sibilities to private corporations largely as a response to declining resources. Decentralisa-
tion of responsibilities for services was sought in a number of countries not only to state
created structures, such as local governments/administrations but also to community
groups and to religious and philanthropic organisations such as churches (See Hyden
1983). The Kenya Government, for instance, relaunched its commitment to harambee a
programme whereby communities provided the basic resources for building specific social
infrastructures with the central government complementing these efforts. Similar efforts
have been noted in other parts of Africa (see policies on hometown associations and ton-
tines in West Africa: Barkan et al 1991, Webster & Fidler 1996 and N'gethe 1998).
With SAP, such initiatives became formalised into policies. World Bank lending
portfolios emphasised the need for its borrowers to utilise opportunities provided by par-
allel or informal economies and institutions and use them as alternative instruments for the
delivery of services. The reasoning here is that these institutions can help to promote com-
petition in the public sector in the production of services and goods (See Silverman 1992,
Litvack et al 1997).
A second reason for embracing local governments is that they offered opportunities
to develop the local public and private sector economies. This idea is premised on the pos-
sibility of separating provision from production of services. Provision deals with such
9questions as 'what public goods and services ought to be provided in what quantity and
quality, how to finance the production of such goods and services, and how to monitor and
regulate the production of such goods and services'. On the other hand, production is the
technical transformation of resources into the delivery of these goods and services. Since
many of the justifications for decentralisation relate to the provision function and most of
the criticisms relate to the production function i.e. the lack of capacity to perform the pro-
duction of these services, the separation of these two functions reduces the need for at-
tempting to create large technical capacities in local government. Unfortunately, many de-
centralisation programmes give local governments the production responsibilities while the
central government keeps the provision responsibilities. Furthermore, since the state was in
most cases in a financial crisis, funding for these decentralised services were sought not
from the traditional tax sources or government transfers but from user fees for basic serv-
ices like health and education and also from private sector and non-governmental organi-
sations including community groups (Barkan et al 1991, Corkery et. al. 1995, Leighton
1996).
ERPs (Economic Restructuring Programmes) assisted local governments to make
the decisions relating to location specific investments subject to national guidelines. They
should have the right to contract for these services with other agents of production, espe-
cially the private sector organisations. Besides ensuring a more efficient allocation of re-
sponsibilities between the central and local governments, this pattern of responsibility allo-
cation would assist the development of the indigenous, small-scale private sector. Silver-
man (1992: 11-12), in a World Bank document notes: 'Demand by local governments for
private sector production of public goods and services should result, eventually, in the de-
centralisation of much of the private sector itself'. This has made it possible in many coun-
tries for the public sector to train managers of private sector enterprises who have contracts
for the delivery of roads and construction activities to the local governments (e.g. Burundi,
Central African Republic, Ghana, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Sierra Leone).
Madagascar and Tanzania have opened their training schools to private sector contractors
as well.
The expectations are that this arrangement will result in the following: a) substan-
tial reduction in the functions and size of all governments, including local governments; b)
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possibility of improved capacity of local governments to perform the more limited range of
economic management activities; c) reduction of local government expenditures both on
investments and staffing; d) reduction of local government and public sector deficits with
possible positive results for increasing finance available to the private sector; e) competi-
tive production of public services would improve the quantity and delivery of services and
also enhance competition and the development of the private sector.
Considerable effort and resources actually went into the implementation of these
programmes of decentralisation in many African countries. The central idea was to seek for
opportunities to reduce central and local government expenditures and size. In many coun-
tries it gave new life to decentralisation initiatives. Many countries, notably Ghana, Ma-
lawi, Zambia, to mention a few, adopted new decentralisation policies. In most cases, the
policies led to the creation of new structures of local government referred to as district de-
velopment agencies or funds (DDFs) which were patterned after the Kenya 'district focus'
(Oyugi 1990, N'gethe 1998).
These structures which were often dominated by appointed officials of the central
government but had some locally elected people as well, would make the plans for their
respective communities or districts with field agencies of the main line central ministries
operating in that district. Moreover, in a country like Zambia, for instance, health and edu-
cation services were actually taken away from local governments and given to separate,
central organs to administer locally. This was also the logic that was followed by many
Anglophone countries, which tried to adopt the British model of the health care service.
The hallmark of these organs was the attempt to separate them from political issues and tie
them closely to the reorganisation of the central ministries for effective delivery of serv-
ices.
The attraction of these models for many national governments in Africa is that it
leaves these agencies primarily under central government control. And this is important for
governments that were not very secure politically. This was the case with decentralisation
reforms in Cameroon and the earlier phases of Cote d'Ivoire reforms. Similarly, centrally
appointed officials chaired Ghana's local assemblies' executive committees. A review of
the Malawi DDF noted that district development committees (DDCs) promoted effective
inter-sectoral co-ordination among field agencies of the government operating in the field.
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On the other hand, they had no legal mandate, financial and human resources of their own.
They were 'concerned only with development and not governance or the recurrent costs of
development' (Mbeye 1997: 10). But these organs received considerable amount of finan-
cial resources mainly from donors who were interested in assisting programmes of decen-
tralisation in these countries. For instance, the Malawi DDFs received 80% of their funding
from donors. Unfortunately, the original goals of expecting that these will lead to major
breakthroughs in improved delivery of services, economic performance or participation
have not been realised. If anything, DDCs have become obstacles to the development of
effective local government institutions as articulated in the relevant constitutions or stat-
utes of these countries (Anderson 1995).
In concluding this section, it is important to point out that besides the deliberate
policy responses discussed here, another form of decentralisation also emerged. This is
best described as decentralisation by default a situation in which a variety of non-state
organisations filled the void left by the absence of state institutions in the production of
goods and services. Operating often outside the reach of the state, these institutions have
been described as informal but they deliver crucial services to the people. The best country
case has been documented for Zaire although it is widely prevalent all over Africa (McGaf-
fey 1992, Olowu et al 1991).
3.4 Phase Four (1990s to the Present):
The onset of democratisation in the 1990s has brought to the fore a fourth wave of
decentralisation reforms in Africa that are linked to the process of political liberalisation
and democratisation. This fourth wave represents in many countries a discontinuity with
past approaches to decentralisation in that a deliberate attempt is made to create local gov-
ernments that are genuinely participatory, responsible to the local communities and relate
actively with other local economic actors other than state institutions what has been re-
ferred to as local embededness (Evans 1996, Ostrom 1996, Helmsing 2000). In the next
section, we discuss in some detail some of the factors that have motivated these funda-
mental reforms and the dilemmas which these countries confront in designing decentrali-
sation policies and programmes which actually enhance democratic participation and im-
proved services.
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4. MOTIVATIONS AND DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRATIC 
DECENTRALISATION
By the beginning of 1980s, whereas personnel of local governments in OECD
countries constituted 42% of all government employees, they were 21 % in Asia, Latin
America (29%) and Africa (10%) (Heller & Tait 1983). More recent figures for the early
1990s on employee size (Schiavo-Campo 1998) and financial decentralisation also follow
the same pattern. Data from UNDP's (1993: 69) Human Development Report 1993 reveals
that in industrial countries, local governments normally account for 20-35% of total gov-
ernment expenditure, (decentralisation expenditure ratios are even higher in countries like
Denmark (45%) and Finland (41%). In developing countries, however, the ratio is usually
below 15% and the ratio is not substantially higher even when defence and debt servicing
are excluded.
The case for centralised governance dominated the policy and academic literature
in African decentralisation (See Wunsch & Olowu 1990, Hulme & Turner 1997). Never-
theless, in the 1990s, the following factors led to renewed interest in new programmes and
policies on decentralisation in Africa:
1. The failure of centralised public sector management evidenced by economic, fiscal and
political crises (Wunsch & Olowu 1990). The resulting decline in state resources has
increased pressure for economic, institutional (public sector) and political reforms
(World Bank 1981, 1989, 1997, Cornia & Helleinner 1994) as part of the search for
new paradigms of governance.
2. The above mentioned failures have stimulated pressures for political reforms by do-
mestic actors outside the state, many of who had become more visible, politically, and
more sophisticated in their critique and protest of state policies as the economic crisis
bit harder. Most of these actors sought to bridge the wide gulf between the state and the
citizen by demanding greater involvement of citizens in the policy processes and the
synchronisation of informal local realities with the highly centralised structures and
operations of the (formal) state system. The most dominant form of politics in Africa is
local politics but the state has always been organised in manner that is oblivious of this
reality. This is a phenomenon which, some argue, is responsible for the persistence of
two publics long after the colonial period the amoral, formal public and the informal
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public which is the real public realm to which most citizens hold moral allegiance. (See
Ekeh 1975, Joseph 1987, Hyden 1999).
3. Pressure from external donors: This is an important consideration given the fact many
African states are heavily dependent on donor funds for development expenditures.
Democratic decentralisation is regarded as one of the key elements of good governance
(GG) programmes. The others are: transparency, accountability, rule of law, electoral
reforms and conflict mitigation. GG programmes are regarded as key to alleviating
poverty to which most bilateral and multilateral donors had committed themselves in
the 1990s (UNDP 1997, OECD 1997). The European Union and several European bi-
lateral donors initiated programmes of 'decentralised co-operation' which look beyond
the traditional central government organs in the recipient countries to incorporate pri-
vate, non-governmental and local government organs (see Hertog 1999, Materu et. al
2000).
4. Growing urbanisation and metropolitanisation in most countries. Urbanisation is vari-
able in Africa but it is marked everywhere by high rates of growth. As Table 1 shows,
African urbanization level is low by world standards (40% compared to a world aver-
age of 51%). However, the rate of growth for the region is high. The southern part is
the fastest growing region followed by the west, east and north (UNCHS 1996).
Table 1: percentage of Urban Population in African Countries, 1950-2030
YEARS
Countries by Region 1950 1960 1990 1995 2000 2020
Eastern Africa
(18)
Middle Africa
(9)
Northern Africa
(7)
Southern Africa
(5)
Western Africa
(17)
5.2
14.2
24.5
38.0
10.2
7.3
17.9
30.0
41.7
14.5
21.8
37.8
44.6
54.9
32.5
25.4
41.6
47.9
58.2
36.1
   29
45.6
51.2
61.3
39.8
43.2
60.4
63.6
71.6
54.6
All Africa
(56)
14.5 18.3 33.9 37.3 40.7 53.9
Latin America
Asia
Europe
N. America
Oceania
41.5
16.4
56.5
63.9
61.3
49.3
21.5
61.1
69.9
66.3
71.5
34.4
73.4
75.2
70.6
74.1
38.6
75.0
76.1
70.8
76.4
42.7
76.7
77.3
71.3
82.9
56.4
83.1
83.4
75.9
World 29.2 34.2 45.2 48.1 51.1 62.0
source: United Nations, World Bank Prospects 1990 New York, 1991 Table A.1
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This phenomenon is itself only a symptom of fundamental changes to the modes of
economic production on the continent. Structural adjustment stimulated economic di-
versification in most countries. In agriculture, many producers have moved away from
cash to arable farming and agrobased industrialisation. There has also been a greater
movement of people to the service industries. Retrenchment in the public and private
sectors has led to the led to the growth of the informal/service sectors which are based
mainly in cities. Other forces have also stimulated greater massive urban migration be-
sides the traditional push-pull factors. One of these is the increased number of females
having secondary education and another has been the massive movement of people in
conflict prone societies to the safety of the major cities. Whereas primary education has
fallen compared to 1980, secondary education has actually increased by more than
double (from 10% of age group to 22% between 1980 and 1993 for females and from
20% to 27% for males (World Bank 1997: 227). Many metropolitan cities in Africa es-
pecially have swollen, and the more so if they are in countries that have experienced
massive conflict in recent times. (See Rakodi 1997). Urban population has thus risen
from 23% in 1980 to 31% in 1995 and the proportion of the total population living in
cities of over 1 million population have risen from only 5% in 1980 to 8% in 1995
(World Bank 1997:231).
In the past, the infrastructures for the few major urban centres were financed from cen-
tral state coffers via the instrumentality of central government parastatals, which were
created to deliver important services. Economic restructuring has led in many countries
to the dissolution of several of these parastatals and their responsibilities transferred to,
or taken over by local authorities or private sector organisations (see Rakodi 1997).
Urbanisation is also indicative of the increasing sophistication of the peoples of the
continent and their intolerance for old forms of domination by central and local elites.
5. The conscious use of decentralisation as a political mechanism by ruling groups to
neutralise, contain or seek compromises with regional or local elites (Crook & Manor
1998, Boone 1998). Decentralisation has proved to be a crucial mechanism in national
and international efforts at conflict resolution in many parts of the continent. It played a
role for instance in the resolution of the long conflicts in Ethiopia, South Africa and
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Mozambique and looks promising in the resolution of raging conflicts in the Sudan,
Morocco, Angola, Senegal, the two Congos etc.
6. Globalisation has also compelled many national governments to adopt decentralisation.
Increasingly, state actors realize that they must compete for resources globally and they
can no longer afford to be pre-occupied with routine management matters in cities and
districts as they once did. Moreover, structural adjustment, retrenchment have reduced
state fiscal and human resources. It becomes necessary to make use of the remaining
officials in the most strategic areas, leaving detailed management to other institutional
actors, under programmes of decentralisation.
In general, it is possible to discern in the period two forces orchestrating demo-
cratic or devolutionary decentralisation (DD). The first is promoted by donors and civil
society actors aimed at empowering the people by giving them greater opportunities for '
voice', promote self-governance, and resource mobilisation. In particular, DD is sought to
remedy the three most serious institutional weaknesses of African governmental systems
weak accountability, poor integration between formal and informal structures of govern-
ance and poor quantity and quality of basic service delivery. Accountability is weak in
most public sector organisations because public service norms and enforcement mecha-
nisms are weak. Formal, state-based structures are also separated from the informal, com-
munity- based structures and NGOs. Finally, weak and ineffective tax instruments together
with these other two problems result in poor and unsustainable delivery of basic services in
most communities (Ekeh 1975, Dia 1996, Joseph 1999). The second stream of demand for
DD is from central state actors who see DD as an opportunity to dump responsibilities
which they can no longer deliver, given the steady decline of state financial and human re-
sources. These two streams coalesce and have stimulated the development of DD in the
continent. Nevertheless, they also contributed to some of the most serious obstacles which
the implementation of DD programmes confronts.
4.1 Problems and Dilemmas of Democratic Decentralisation.
Democratic decentralisation confronts serious problems of policy design and im-
plementation in all countries and especially in poor African countries.
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In the past, the problems that DD faced theoretical objections. For example, some
scholars wondered whether local government and democracy are indeed compatible even
in industrial societies. They argued that democracy exults the principle of equality whereas
local governments celebrate the principle of differentiation (Langrod 1953). Moreover, se-
rious doubts were cast on the idea of local democracy in developing countries where the
preconditions for popular democracy high literacy levels, communication and education,
an established and secure middle class, a vibrant civil society, relatively limited forms of
material and social inequality and a broadly secular public ideology. All of these are the
product of the industrial or capitalist revolution, which are yet to take place in most coun-
tries of the developing world (Huntington 1968, Hyden 1983, Leftwich 1993).
Secondly, it was also argued that local autonomy is only feasible at high levels of
economic development. Fred Riggs (1964) spoke of the 'law' of circular causation in poor
countries. Decentralisation would only promote the decentralisation of poverty. (See also
Prud'homme 1995 and Bennett 1994). According to this view, local governments may
make contributions to the allocative functions of government but they generally cannot
contribute positively to distributive and stabilisation functions. However, in a developing
country context, local governments are even not able to make any contributions to alloca-
tive efficiency for a variety of reasons, the absence of a democratic culture, inter-local mo-
bility problems and most importantly, because of rampart corruption at the local level
(Prud'homme 1995).
Recent experiences of successful DDs in LDCs have challenged these views. There
is increasing evidence that local governments can contribute to the resolution of the gov-
ernance crisis confronted by many African countries (World Bank 1989:60). Evidence also
exists which shows that local people possess substantial knowledge of their environments
and their societies to enable them contribute to solving their own problems locally (Ri-
chards 1985, Olowu et al. 1991, Dia 1996, Esman & Uphoff 1984). Appropriate institu-
tional and policy design can help ensure that local governments impact positively on effi-
ciency, equity and macroeconomic stability (Ostrom et. al 1993, Silverman 1997, Litvack
et al. 1998).
Currently, the feasibility of local government in African states seems to turn on the
practical problems confronting decentralisation. These can be categorised into three di-
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lemmas political, economic and managerial dilemmas which confront local government
reforms in Africa.
Political Dilemmas: Devolutionary decentralisation (DD) confronts two major po-
litical problems. The first is the unwillingness of political and administrative leaders to
share monopoly power-inherited since colonial times. This is in part due to fears that de-
volutionary decentralisation might undermine national cohesion and fan the embers of se-
cession which are usually real considerations in societies in which ethnic and community
loyalties are quite strong relative to national cohesion. Politics is always defined in local
terms. There is also the fear that devolution might compromise the integrity of nationally
delivered services. In many instances, these rational fears are often a cloak for the fear of
loosening their grip on political power which in many countries is monopolised by the
ruling elites at the centre. Another way of looking at these problems is that devolutionary
decentralisation is viewed in the lenses of a zero-sum power game in which local actors
gain at the expense of the centre rather than a positive sum power game in which all play-
ers both local and centre gain over time.
Different strategies are utilised to ensure continuing central control. In Ghana, gov-
ernment appointed District Council Executives wield power over the elected councils. In
Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Local Government dissolves the councils at will. In Tanzania,
senior administrators express strong fears to decentralisation since it might lead to serious
corruption and mis use by councillors (Ayee 1996, Barkan 1998).
 A second political dilemma is the problem of local elite capture. In many in-
stances, it is local elites rather than the most vulnerable that capture decentralised power
which is then utilised to repress the local minorities including women and stranger ele-
ments in the various communities. Many traditional rulers in different parts of Africa have
used decentralised power to obstruct development of their people by diverting decentral-
ised resources to personal uses and are thus opposed to forms of basic modern education,
health, sanitation and water supplies because of their fear that these may break their hold
on local power. The strong effort made by the military to promote DD in Nigeria from the
mid 1970s crystallised in the emergence in the early 1990s of very powerful elected local
government chief executives who abused these powers. Similar developments were noticed
in the urban municipalities of Tanzania with cities selling choice public lands reserved for
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constructing school playgrounds, roads and infrastructure development, tree planting and
protected species to Asians and Arabs. (Gboyega 1998, Mukandala 1998).
Economic Dilemmas: Decentralisation in poor countries confronts three major di-
lemmas. First, as earlier noted above, there is the fear that devolution may complicate the
tasks of economic stabilisation, as central actors are not able to effectively control local
spending. Many also believe that local governments are not very good at addressing redis-
tribution questions although this is the case only when the focus is on inter-jurisdictional
rather than intra-jurisdictional inequalities. Even the latter is based on the faulty assump-
tion of citizens' easy mobility from one locality to another. On the other hand, evidence has
been adduced to show that local governments can be effective in redressing not only intra-
local and inter-local disparities if backed by appropriate intergovernmental transfer sys-
tems (Smoke 1999, For the Nigerian case see Olowu 1990)
Secondly, to what extent is decentralisation feasible in the absence of wider institu-
tional, political and economic reforms? Centralised infrastructure investment decision by
public and private agencies make it difficult to implement decentralisation. For instance,
Nzokenu (1994) suggested the need for land reforms in many parts of Africa if decentrali-
sation is to be advanced in many rural parts of Africa land is presently held by local elites
or governments in trust for the people, but in reality it is only accessible to the rich and
powerful. But land reform must also be accompanied with the reform of the banking sys-
tem which at the present time is concentrated in the urban centres. A number of experi-
ments of community banking have shown the great possibilities which exists for mobilis-
ing idle savings in the rural areas for economic development purposes (Webster & Fiddler
1996, Mabogunje 1995). Clearly, the development of a favourable local economic system
will provide the enabling environment for the development of critical economic and social
infrastructure all, which are crucial for economic development.
Similarly, an independent judiciary as an independent arbiter is also crucial to the
enhancement of decentralised governance. Instead of relying on central governments to
resolve disputes between local government authorities or between local government and
the national governments, a strengthened judiciary can more impartially resolve these is-
sues. Similarly, effective local legislatures can act as more effective checks on local ex-
ecutives than the central government in many instances.
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A third economic dilemma arising from all of the above mentioned considerations
is that decentralisation involves more not less costs the costs of new institutions, staffing,
procedures and training for all concerned etc (World Health Organization 1997). In the
short run, resources must be mobilised to underwrite decentralisation. Unfortunately, many
countries have a very weak fiscal resource base and cannot therefore finance these costs.
Indeed, fiscal crisis was one of the most important reasons why political and economic re-
forms, including decentralisation were undertaken.
Policy and Management Dilemmas: An appropriate institutional design that re-
spond adequately to the above mentioned problems and how to sustain the programme of
decentralisation once initiated constitute the key policy and management dilemmas. The
problem is compounded by the absence of reliable data on governmental performance and
also by weak policy management capacity at central and local levels in developing coun-
tries generally but especially so in African countries (Grindle & Thomas 1990, Mutahaba
& Balogun 1992).
This third set of problems are usually the most difficult to resolve. Some of the
most difficult design and management issues include the following: how to implement de-
centralisation policies in all parts of a country, given their different levels of development
including the possibilities of adopting a phased approach, how to transform the zero-sum
game perception of decentralisation into a positive-sum game in which all sides gain.
Other critical design issues include: how to ensure that decentralisation helps national inte-
gration rather than secessionist bids, how to mobilise the necessary resources to finance the
heavy cost of decentralisation reforms which are often designed in the first instance to re-
duce costs. Yet, other issues also include allocation of responsibilities between central and
local governments and between different tiers of local authorities; the balance between fi-
nancial powers and/or resources and allocated responsibilities, the treatment of regions as
distinct from local community structures; and of rural and urban areas etc. Another diffi-
cult design issue is how to integrate the informal structures of community governance with
the formal structures of the state without undermining the integrity of either of the two.
Failure in any of these areas has often meant the death knell of local government reforms
in many countries of Africa.
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These problems have remained pervasive in most countries, almost negating all ef-
forts at democratic decentralisation. Five country cases are reviewed below.
5.  EVALUATION OF AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALISATION 
(DD) POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF THE 1990S.
As already noted above, a new form of decentralisation programme is discernible in
countries such as Uganda, South Africa, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and Ethiopia. What constitutes
the main elements of this new form of decentralisation?
Conventionally, evaluations of decentralisation programmes tend to focus on insti-
tutions or processes. Attempt is usually made to measure the extent to which decentralisa-
tion policies or processes increase the autonomy of decentralised agencies (See for instance
Rondinelli 1981, Ayee 1996, Vengroff & Umeh 1997, etc). Selznik (1949), for instance,
suggested the following four criteria: a) discretion: the powers to determine what to do; b)
personnel: the power to hire and fire; c) finance: the power to raise and commit resources;
and d) Co-operation: the power to establish harmonious relationships between the organi-
sation and its environment.
Building on these earlier efforts, we propose that since decentralisation is a means
not an end in itself, it is necessary to establish the goals which decentralisation policies
seek and distinguish these from the means or mechanisms for realising such goals. In de-
veloping an analytical framework, the three sub-goals identified earlier for DD are utilised.
These are accountable use of resources, institutional synergy between formal and informal
structures and effective service delivery. They are intermediate to the goals of self-
governance, democratic participation, institutional diversity and differentiation and
economic growth which are mentioned either explicitly or implicitly in many decentrali-
sation policy statements (see Adamolekun 1991, Wunsch 1991, Smith 1996, Ostrom 1996,
Dia 1996, OECD 1997, Gershberg 1998, Olowu 1999, Barkan 1998, Blair 2000).
The analysis, which follows, takes four sample cases from the more progressive
forms of devolutionary decentralisation and federal forms and contrasts them with one case
of the conventional type (Ghana). As was pointed out earlier, deconcentration could be a
legitimate policy goal. However, its objective is essentially to decongest the central gov-
ernment and possibly increase central government control on the localities. To the extent
21
that incentives are created for effective performance of central functions, it has value in
increasing policy implementation effectiveness. Devolution and federalism, on the other
hand, seek to create incentives for local (governance) actors to make and implement deci-
sions in respect of crucial, locally based services, thus forcing them to mobilise resources
and strategize their use in a responsible way.
Seven major mechanisms are used to implement DD and can also be used to evalu-
ate the extent of decentralisation in any country (Table 2). The analysis starts with the allo-
cation of responsibilities for services between central and local level governments. In a
completely centralised polity, all services are delivered by the central government no mat-
ter how local. The principle of subsidiarity suggests that as much as possible the smallest
beneficiary local community should provide its own services, assuming that it has access
to the required revenues. As already indicated above, many countries in LDCs do decen-
tralise responsibilities but not the means of financing the programme of decentralisation. A
second mechanism in decentralisation is therefore the decentralisation of financing of de-
volved responsibilities. The arrangements could be in the form of granting to local gov-
ernments their own revenue sources (with responsibilities to set the base and rate), cost re-
covery (nominal, full or partial), transfers from higher governments and granting them bor-
rowing powers. The third mechanism is the decentralisation of decision-making powers.
Many central governments would give financial powers to local communities but not the
decision-making powers to approve budgets or laws. Such decisions continue to be made
by the central government often defeating the very essence of decentralisation. For in-
stance, there is documented evidence that central governments cause delays in approving
local government budgets in Kenya and Nigeria, and that this constitutes an important ex-
planation of programme implementation failures. In the latter country it led to radical re-
forms of local government in the 1980s (Oyugi 1990, Olowu 1990). But this is a responsi-
bility that could and should be undertaken by local governments that are responsible to
their constituents.
The fourth mechanism is the management of the personnel of decentralised serv-
ices whether by central or local entities. For various reasons this often takes a longer time
to fully delegate to local governments. The unified approach is a mid-way house between
the extremes of integrated and separate personnel arrangements but unified services in
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many African countries have ended up functioning as integrated personnel systems. Fur-
thermore, many professionals are reluctant to work in local governments, fearing reduction
in their status or job security. Different approaches have been used to resolve this problem
in many countries (see Tendler's (1997) analysis of health sector reform in Brazil 1987-92
and Olowu & Wunsch's (1990) analysis of the same phenomenon in Nigeria).
The fifth and often a very difficult mechanism is the one relating to the enforcement
of local government accountability. Should national government bureaucracies or local as-
semblies enforce accountability? Both are problematic in developing country circum-
stances. Contrary to conventional thinking, accountability is actually weak even in national
governments because there are no strong institutions to canvass for or enforce accountabil-
ity at this level. Many central agencies are limited to post-audit financial reports and even
this is in arrears in some countries of up to 5-10 years. Similarly, citizens at the local level
are not able to use either voice or exit options because of the high transaction costs in-
volved e.g. moving from one locality to another without credit, reliable information or ac-
cess to land etc. Although central governments try to enforce accountability at local levels,
through inspectorates and dissolution of erring councils, this has not institutionalised
higher levels of integrity among local officials or their accountability to local citizens.
Clearly, a mixture of both central and local accounting institutions will be needed but the
systems that have worked better are those in which effort has been made to create inde-
pendent organs of accountability: special audit bodies (Uganda), local ombudsmen or
complaints bodies (Nigeria).
The sixth mechanism is the involvement of other institutional actors outside the
state in the delivery of services. There are two possibilities here to involve private and
NGOs or communities as agents or privatise the services to them. In the former, they help
to produce the service while the responsibility for provision rests with the council. In the
latter, these organisations are responsible for providing and producing the service, under
some form of local authority regulatory framework.
Finally, there is the extent of political competition that is allowed at the local level.
Some countries legally disallow party competition at the local level even though they may
as in Ghana permit them at the national level. In other countries party competition is barred
at the national and local levels as in Uganda but citizens are allowed to make reasoned
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choices among several candidates that are in effect sponsored by different local political
forces. Yet, in others, the state may officially allow multi parties but effectively ensure the
neutralisation of political forces at the local level and atimes even at the national level as
well (Ethiopia).
This framework does not assume that any form of decentralisation is either good or
bad. Rather, evaluation is made contingent on the three objective goals of decentralisation:
accountable use of resources, institutional synergy and services delivery and the seven
suggested mechanisms that are used to measure the maturity or success of any pro-
gramme/policy of decentralisation. Besides, overall judgement of whether the programme
of decentralisation is deconcentrated or devolved is the outcome of the analysis rather than
accepting official labels, which can be very confusing. Finally, the framework analyses
decentralisation from the viewpoint of polycentric or complex networks in which each of
the institutional actors (central, local government, private and nongovernmental organisa-
tions) are essential players. For instance, it is paradoxical but significant fact that effective
decentralisation requires the deliberate strengthening of central institutions and agencies to
enable them to support the effectiveness of decentralised agencies. (Adamolekun 1999,
Ostrom 1996, Tendler 1997, Gershberg 1998).
Case studies of five national decentralisation programmes are analysed using this
framework below and their summary ratings are provided in Table 2.
5.1 Ethiopia
Until the adoption of a democratic federal constitution of ten autonomous federal
regional states in December 1994, Ethiopia was ruled for many years first as a feudal em-
pire and from 1975, as a highly centralised Leninist socialist state led by the military. The
new Ethiopian constitution, adopted after the election of the current government in 1995
stipulates that 'every nationality and people.has the right to a full measure of self-
government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory
that it inhabits..'
The regions vary widely in population and competence. Oromiya, the largest state
has a population of 17 million whereas Gambela contains only 110,000 population. They
have wide (residual) powers including the ability to secede from the federation. They are
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Table 2: Framework for Analyzing Decentralization in Developing Countries:
African Applications (Potential and actual scores)
Ghana Uganda Ethiopia Cote d'Ivoire Nigeria
1.  Transfer of Responsibilities
       -Major/Minor Basic Services(10) 10 10 10 10 10
2.  Transfer of Financial Resources (10)  6 6 6 5 8
      -Major Tax Sources (5)
      -User Fees (Nominal or partial/full cost recovery)(3)
      -Central Transfers (adequacy, equity,
        responsiveness)(2)
3.  Decision-Making Powers (10) 5 10 10 7 10
     -Budget making/Approval (6)
     -Budget Implementation (4)
4.  Personnel Management (15) 4 10 6 7 8
     -Separate (10)
     -Unified (5)
     -Integrate (0)
5.  Accountability Mechanisms (10) 4 8 5 5 7
     -Central (M&E)(3)
     -Local Citizens (5)
     -Central/Local Citizens (10) 2 3 2 3 3
6.  Involvement of other Institutional Actors (10)
      -Privatization & Local Regulation (5)
      -Co-Production (10)
7.  Local Political Competition (15) 0 3 3 5 5
      -Full (10)
      -Partial (5)
     -None (0)
Total (70) 31 50 42 42 51
empowered 'to establish a state administration that best advances self-rule and a demo-
cratic order ' in their states. Their responsibilities include the formulation and execution of
economic and social development policies, land and natural resource, state police forces
and maintenance of public order. Below the regions are Zones, Woredas (or districts) and
kebeles (communes) all of which are assigned specific responsibilities within the province
of the state but devolution is mainly felt at the level of the Woredas. They formulate their
own budgets and are responsible for front-line responsibilities such as health, education,
and soil conservation, observation of legal rights and law and order. The kebele functions
to all intents and purposes as a field administration of the woreda.
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The Amhara regional constitution, for instance, empowers the woreda administra-
tion to implement regional laws and regulations, to make social and economic develop-
ment plans for its locality, decide on its own internal affairs and to develop its locality. It
also has a judicial unit from which appeals can be made to other regional courts (Zikre Ga-
zette 1995).
On financing arrangements, Ethiopian regions are entitled to levy and collect taxes
on incomes, utilities, private property, mining rent and royalties on forest resources. They
also share in the concurrent taxation of profits and, mining rents etc. Given the variable
institutional capacity of the regions and other sub-national units, it is not surprising that
federal transfers to the states have become the major means of financing the new federal
system. In 1994/5, the regions collected only 18% of domestic tax revenues but they were
responsible for almost 36% of the total (recurrent and capital) expenditures in the country.
In the social sector especially schools and health services the share of the centre has fallen
to only 27%, with the regional agencies and others responsible for the balance of over
70%.
On Decision Making Powers, the Ethiopian regions, woredas and kebeles have
elective offices, a sharp contrast to several years of imperial and socialist governments
when all of these positions were appointed by the state. These organs are also helping to
bridge the wide gulf between the formal and informal structures. The informal structures
have been used as a platform to define a different agenda from the national level politics
although the opportunity has also been used to settle political scores.
On personnel management, regional governments are responsible for managing
their own personnel. From a situation in which all personnel were central personnel, today,
the regional states have ten times (200,000) more personnel than the central government
(20,000). Personnel at the local government level (woredas, kebeles) are however, paid by
and responsible to the regional state.
Accountability Mechanisms: In spite of their heavy dependence on the federal gov-
ernment for funds, Ethiopian regional states were originally responsible only to them-
selves. In 1997, following a number of scandalous revelations of financial malfeasance in
the regions, a new finance bill was passed into law, which made it mandatory for regions
to account for federal transfers to the federal auditor general. Each state has its own auditor
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but the capacity of the regions is so variable. At the regional level, the tradition of account-
ability to higher government bureaucracy has continued even though a number of struc-
tures exist at the local level to enforce accountability. For instance, many communities
have been able to utilise their power of recall (in federal and state constitutions) to dismiss
'corrupt' politicians, often leading to considerable instability in some regions. In spite of
some of the negative overtones of these provisions, the practice is helping to develop a
new culture of accountability at the local level.
Other Institutional Actors: There is very limited involvement of other institutional
actors in the delivery of services in Ethiopia. However, in the health sector, there are a
number of non-governmental agencies that are active. Ditto for water in the arid areas of
the country. However, there is very little linkage between the local government system and
these organisations.
Party Political Competition at the Local Level: Even though the constitution grants
the citizens freedom of political association, the ruling party has managed to effectively
neutralise the other political parties, which are mainly ethnic based. They are not repre-
sented in the parliament and they do not control any region. The opposition argues that
Ethiopian 'democratic' elections were rigged (Young 1997, Ayenew 1998).
5.2 Uganda:
Museveni's National Resistance Army fought different Uganda governments (led
by Okello and Obote) to a standstill and ultimately took power from the Obote administra-
tion in 1986. Museveni argued that his struggle was against misrule and chaos. Originally,
the new local governments were created around the Resistance councils, which the gov-
ernment found useful in its guerrilla struggles. In 1993, a statute was passed consolidating
these councils into five tiers of local councils comprising village, parish, subcounty, county
and district councils. The district council is the apex of the system of local government and
had extensive powers for formulating socio-economic development plans and providing
basic infrastructure and social services. When the new national constitution was introduced
in 1997, the system of local government was an important element of that constitution. A
new law, the Ugandan Local Governments Act of 1997 created (from the erstwhile Resis-
tance councils) 45 district/city, 13 municipal, 863 sub-county/city and 970 town councils.
27
Local authorities are given broad powers to develop their local communities. These in-
clude: education services which cover primary, secondary, trade, special and technical
education; medical and health services including hospitals, health centres, dispensaries,
maternity and other basic health services, water services, road services that are not under
the responsibility of the national government, long list of competencies in land use and
administration, forests, water, women etc. (Lubanga 1995, Timbaingana 1998).
Financing Arrangements: Local governments in Uganda have access to selected
own revenues. These include graduated personal tax, rates, rents, property tax, royalties,
tamp duties, registration fees, market dues, trade licences and fees. It is the sub-county
level that collects these revenues out of which it remits 35% to the district council, 25%
and 5% each to the village, parish and county councils respectively. In the cities, lower di-
visions remit 50% to the urban/municipal councils. But the backbone of the local govern-
ment finance in Uganda are the various transfers of financial resources to the local gov-
ernments by the national government. The broad responsibilities given to these councils
and the relatively low levels of the revenue bases made dependence on central government
transfers inevitable.
The national government has worked out a principle of transferring substantial re-
sources to local governments. They comprise unconditional, conditional (for feeder roads
maintenance, primary education, primary health care and agricultural extension) and
equalisation grants. In 1996/97, the central government transfers amounted to 176.5 mil-
lion Ugandan shillings. More than one half of this went to the payment of salaries in pri-
mary and secondary schools. A Local Government Finance Commission has been set up
with responsibility for monitoring and recommending the appropriate formula for distrib-
uting transfers to LGs.
The fact that subcounties and divisions can retain a substantial portion of their
revenue collections has led to a 70% increase in the revenue collections of the district and
urban councils in that country.
Decision Making Powers: Before 1986, central government field officials admin-
istered local governments in Uganda. This has given way to closely contested elections at
each of the five levels in spite of the absence of multiparty politics. The newly constituted
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local bodies are responsible for approving budgets, rather than refer them to central gov-
ernment for approval as was done in the past.
Personnel Management of Decentralised Services: The Ugandan government un-
dertook a major reorganisation of the system of personnel management at the local gov-
ernment level. Before this time, local government officials were either civil servants sec-
onded to LGs or placed in a unified personnel system for all local governments in the
country. The reforms constituted each district council into a separate personnel agency.
The weakness with the unified system was that senior local government personnel were
treated for all intents and purposes as central government staff. This was because central
government officials managed the unified structures, as it is the case in many other African
countries that utilise the unified personnel system.
District executive secretaries and town clerks have responsibility for LG employees
and pay their salaries, assisted by a district service committee. Field officers of decentral-
ised functions have been transferred to LGs. Each district has a district service committee
responsible for LG employee matters. In turn, secretaries and town clerks are responsible
to the local councils even though most of the salaries of LG staff are paid through transfers
from the central government (see above).
Accountability mechanisms: There is an attempt to get the local governments to
rely more on local rather than central institutions. To this end, a number of institutions
have been created. They include the LG Tenders Board, an LG Public Accounts Commit-
tee, which serves as a form of Public Accounts Committee for LGs in a district and a Local
Government Auditor. These institutions have been quite effective in detecting corruption
in the system and the local councils are closely involved in their operations.
Involvement of Other Institutional Actors: Private sector and non-governmental or-
ganisations are utilised as agents for the local governments for production and provision of
some services. Several services have also been privatised to private and not for profit or-
ganisations. Besides, many district and municipal councils have, for instance, contracted
with private enterprises the collection of their revenues. Local level privatisation has been
limited.
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5.3 Cote d'Ivoire:
Two major forces French colonisation and the dominant single party, the Parti de-
mocratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), had shaped politics, economy and administration.
But by the 1980s, cocoa and coffee prices slumped in the world market. Moreover, there
were strong resentments against excessive authoritarianism and corruption among the rul-
ing elites, which was perceived to have led to the immiseration of the masses of the rural
peasants.
A radical reform of the system of local governance was undertaken in the late
1980s to rejuvenate the political system and to reduce the financial squeeze on the central
government. Between 1987 and 1995, 135 newly elected communes (local bodies) were
created for Abidjan (which had ten .of these municipalities and other smaller towns and
cities.
Communities formed the basis of this commune system rather than the old admin-
istrative structures the model population of each commune was around 10,000 although it
was quite variable. Crook (1996: 702) notes the main features of this system:
Each commune is an authority with legal personality and 'financial auton-
omy'.meaning. the right to create and manage its own budget, property and re-
sources. Legal accountability to democratically elected officials is firmly based at
the local level. The mayor and his deputies who form the executive authority are
elected councillors, elected to office by the municipal council, not appointed by
government as in the pre-1980 system. The mayor can appoint and dismiss com-
mune staff (except the seconded chief administrative posts) but all the employees
including civil servants are accountable to the mayor. The executive is formally
accountable tot he council. The council itself is a wholly elected body.
Broad competence is given to these communes in terms of responsibilities provi-
sion of educational buildings and equipment, cultural and social facilities, public health ad
sanitary services, maintenance of local roads, markets, bus stations, administrative services
including census, births, deaths and marriages, allocation plots and plot development.
Some old style financial controls are still in place. The communes make and approve their
budgets but they are implemented by the central government Treasury departments e.g.
payment of creditors. Communes are still subject to close supervision by the Ministry of
Interior and also have very little control over their rates of taxation or rates collection.
Even though one of the key motivations for the reform was the mobilisation of local and
private financial sources, the central government has been quite generous in providing fis-
cal transfers to the communes to sustain the reform.
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Even though the democratic structures exist and are functional, the channels of
consultation between local citizens and local political and administrative officials remain
constrained and as a result communes are not always responsive to the needs of their citi-
zens.
Crook (1996:702-3) notes that unlike many other countries with 'mixed 'forms of
devolution/decentralisation, Ivorian communal administration is not simply a regrouping
of deconcentrated central ministries under the nominal control of an elected council.
5.4 Nigeria:
Nigeria initiated a global programme of devolutionary decentralisation in 1976 in
the hope that these structures will form the basis for democratic renewal and the restoration
of civilian government. Successive (military) administrations sought to sustain and deepen
these reforms. In particular, from 1988 to 1992, the military government under the leader-
ship of Ibrahim Babangida took some far-reaching decisions, which were aimed at im-
proving the effectiveness of democratically elected local governments in Nigeria (Gboyega
1998).
This included the abolition of the state ministries of local governments, which were
thought to be the clog in the wheel of local government progress. Federal transfers were
now paid directly to the local governments rather than passed through the states in confor-
mity with federal practice. In addition, local governments were granted the authority to
make and approve their own budgets; in the past such approvals were given by state
authorities and were often delayed. Primary and basic health education was transferred to
the local governments. In view of the additional financial implications of this development,
the total amount of federal transfers to local governments were increased from 10% (it was
only 3% in 1976) to 20% of federal revenues. Considering the fact that this was in the hey
days of an oil boom, this led to huge increases in local government revenues.
The results have been impressive. The quality of their leadership both political and
administrative improved dramatically. The local governments also increased their capacity
to deliver services to their clientele leading to substantial improvements in the quality of
basic infrastructures a fact that was further helped by special initiatives on rural infra-
structures and credit. On the other hand, the reforms boosted the power of the local chief
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executives without a corresponding effectiveness of citizens' control. Under the fourth re-
public the state assemblies who now have the responsibility for local government oversight
and policy development have captured most of powers devolved by the federal government
to local governments. (Olowu 1996, Gboyega 1998).
Up to the present time, the fortunes of the Nigerian local government system have
been tied to that of the country's successive military governments' political recivilianization
programmes. The resulting local government system is adjudged to have facilitated the de-
livery of services and a more even distribution of the country's resources leading to eco-
nomic progress and political stability in a country dominated by the excesses and corrup-
tion of military officials at state and national levels.
In Nigeria's fourth republic (which began in May 1999), local governments exer-
cise all the powers of autonomous governments they were originally conceived as third
tiers of Nigeria's federal democracy (Adamolekun 1984). They have access to own reve-
nues and huge intergovernmental transfers (including a share of VAT), own personnel and
budgetary powers and all political parties freely canvass for votes here as they do at other
levels. Local governments are actively engaging private and non-governmental and com-
munity organisations in the provision of goods and services.
5.5 Ghana:
The Ghanaian decentralisation programme transferred a total of 86 responsibilities
to the new Ghanaian 110 district assemblies. These responsibilities were ones which cen-
tral government departments and agencies delivered in the past primary and secondary
schools, hospitals, road construction and maintenance. Generous own revenues were allo-
cated to the local governments, which provide 80% of total revenues of the councils, the
rest coming from central government transfers. Central government personnel responsible
for decentralised services from a total of 22 central government departments were man-
dated to work in the districts thus unifying the local field administration system with the
local government system.
Over ten years since the current decentralisation were initiated, the field agencies
remain unintegrated into the district assemblies. They still receive their authorisation and
funds from their headquarters and the relevant laws to effect the decentralised administra-
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tion envisaged under the programme remain unsigned. Furthermore, the budgets of these
districts must be approved by central agencies. Their topmost personnel continue to be
central officials. The most prominent person at the local level is the District Chief Execu-
tive (DCE), a central government appointee who chairs the executive meetings of the
council comprising elected councillors. He also represents the district assembly in the re-
gional planning council (Ayee 1999). The major form of accountability is still to the cen-
tral government but this has not prevented the loss of huge sums of money. For instance,
some 25 of these District Chief Executives (DCEs) were dismissed in 1997 for corruption
(Ayee 1996, 1997). Non-governmental organisations are quite active in the delivery of ba-
sic services in various communities but there is little or no direct contact with the districts
(Crook 1994).
It is possible to argue that the Ghanaian decentralisation programme was rather
ambitious in the sense that it expected local governments with weak governance capacities
to manage responsibilities, financial and human resources of 22 central government de-
partments in the field. In this sense, it attempted to fuse field administration and local gov-
ernments. This has not worked as the critical legal and administrative instruments were not
implemented ten years after the reform and there has been resistance from administrators
to such draconian fusion of local and field administrative systems. Besides, the reform also
represent an attempt to promote the ruling party (indirectly) in the communities by adopt-
ing the non-party electoral systems as the ruling party had all the advantages including
nominating 30% of the membership, including members of the parliament as members of
the district assembly councils and appointing the chief executives of the DA. As it hap-
pened, this one-party rule seems to have boomeranged in that the Ghanaian people in 2001
successfully voted out the ruling party at the national level. This is likely to bring about
dramatic changes the Ghanaian local government system.
CONCLUSION
The review in this paper points conclusively to the fact that among countries pur-
suing democratic decentralisation as a policy choice, fundamentally new orientations are
discernible. Greater attention is paid to local peoples' participation and their empowerment,
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the accountability of local governments to local people and close interaction with local
non-state institutions. Problems encountered by these experiments include the following:
• Preoccupation of decentralisation policies with vertical intergovernmental relations in-
volving the transfer of authority and especially of resources from central to local gov-
ernments at a time when central governments are experiencing severe resource short-
age. The result is that governments are not able to keep up their promises on resource
transfers. And, when they do in the absence of adequate capacity in local governments,
other serious problems of corruption, effective management of available resources are
posed. In contrast much less attention is devoted to horizontal intergovernmental rela-
tions between different tiers of local authorities e.g. among the five tiers of local gov-
ernment in Uganda or among urban and rural areas (Ethiopia2).
• Uneven and unequal development of infrastructural and institutional capacities be-
tween regions and communities of devolving states belie the commitment to global de-
centralisation. This strengthens the case for asymmetric decentralisation starting with
the most able regions, a strategy that may further such inequalities. A few countries
have already adopted this approach (e.g. Tanzania, Namibia).
• Few countries have been able to allow party political competition and democratic de-
centralisation. Many countries seem interested in democratic decentralisation within
the context of a de facto one-party state (e.g. Ghana, Uganda, and Ethiopia).
• Insufficient attention has been paid to developing alternative revenue sources. While
intergovernmental transfers are necessary for equity and capacity reasons, large infu-
sions of central grants to regional/local governments have undermined incentives for
the development of local revenue effort (e.g. Ghana, Nigeria). Research shows that
much more resources can be mobilised especially from property rates, user charges and
investment portfolios particularly in urban centres.
• Classical accountability mechanisms of election and representation need to be compli-
mented with additional participatory forms such as recall, referendum, local ombuds-
men, service delivery surveys, and participatory budgeting. There are a number of new
initiatives to encourage more active civic participation in the budgetary processes pat-
terned after some Latin American examples and sponsored by the Municipal Develop-
ment Programme (MDP) based in Harare.
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The resolution of these problems will take time, resolve and determination and
imagination of those involved in managing these processes in these countries. A few stra-
tegic actions might help.
First, democratic decentralisation should be approached as a process not an event.
As a process, it may need to be phased beginning from the urban and fast growing metro-
politan areas. There may also be a need to develop different capacities of local govern-
ments over a phased period: for the delivery of specific service sectors, for development of
policy making and regulatory capacities as distinct from service delivery capacities etc.
Second, donors have provided a great impetus for the current reforms. However,
they tend to pursue policies that are nor feasible in many contexts e.g. private sector devel-
opment when a whole array of non-governmental organisations e.g. religious and commu-
nity-based organs remain largely sidelined in the process of democratic decentralisation.
Yet, they could become critical players as they were in the colonial period.
Thirdly, the high incidence of inequalities in many countries indicates that by de-
veloping local governments' taxing capacities (not an easy task by any means), local gov-
ernments may be better able to address serious problems of infrastructure development.
Through this, they may be able to alleviate some of the worst excesses of poverty in a con-
tinent in which poverty is estimated to grow within the present century. Local governments
are particularly well placed to target the informal sector, small scale industries, provide
agricultural support to farmers as well as manage directly or via contracts a whole range of
social development programmes at the local level. Accountability to local people may also
be enhanced.
Finally, DD implies a new set of responsibilities for central governments. The ca-
pacity to undertake policy development, review and monitor decentralisation policy im-
plementation in the central government is lacking in many countries. There is a tendency to
resort to the suspension of local councils as the solution to tackling teething problems of
local government institutionalisation.
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NOTES
Eastern Africa includes: British Indian Ocean Territory, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Sey-
chelles, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Middle Africa includes: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe, Zaire.
Northern Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western
Sahara.
Southern Africa includes: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.
Western Africa includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, St. Helena, Senegal, Si-
erra Leone, Togo.
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ENDNOTES
1 Although African socio-economic conditions have improved somewhat in the second half of the 1990s,
poverty is an important reality in the continent. Africa is home to the largest numbers of least developed
countries. Over a half of the countries in the World Development Report 1998 have per capita incomes below
the poverty line of US$365 per annum or US$1/day.
2 The Ethiopian national and regional constitutions make no reference to municipal councils. A few states are
beginning to consider draft statutes that give legal recognition to municipal councils in this rapidly urbanising
country.
